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I. INTRODUCTIONIN 1992 a total of 1662 general aviation' aircraft accidents
loccurred with an average of one fatal accident per day.2
I The phrase "general aviation" refers to "[a] 11 civil aviation operations other than
scheduled air services and nonscheduled air transport operations for remuneration
or hire." FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL G-1,
May 27, 1993 [hereinafter AIM]. (Pilots are required to have obtained instruction on
the use of the AIM during their private pilot training. 14 C.F.R. § 61.105 (a) (1)
(1993)).
Recent legislation proposing a federal statute of repose defines a "General Avia-
tion Aircraft" as an aircraft with a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 pas-
sengers that was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in scheduled passenger-
carrying operations. H.R. Rep. No. 3087, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § b (1993).
2 AOPA AIR SAFETY FOUNDATION, JOSEPH T. NALL GENERAL AVIATION SAFETY RE-
PORT, 2 (1992).
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Although the causes of the accidents were numerous,
weather-related accidents accounted for at least forty per-
cent of the general aviation fatalities.' The leading
weather-related cause was "VFR flight into IMC. '' 4  A Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 5 report con-
cluded that VFR (Visual Flight Rules) 6 flight into IMC
(Instrument Meteorological Conditions)7 was a factor in
361 general aviation accidents between 1983 and 1987 that
resulted in 583 fatalities.8 These statistics indicate that most
VFR-into-IMC accidents yield disastrous results.9 When a
non-instrument rated pilot is involved in this type of acci-
dent, a dispute frequently develops between the pilot (or
his estate) and his insurer on the issue of whether liability
coverage exists for the occurrence.
This article analyzes the judicial decisions that discuss the
issue of whether a non-instrument rated pilot, who is al-
lowed to fly only under Visual Flight Rules, is properly rated
for a flight when he suffers an accident after flying into
s Id. at 11.
4 Id. at 21.
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent agency of the
United States charged with investigating civil aircraft accidents and determining the
probable cause thereof. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1902-03(a) (1988).
6 See infra notes 10, 12-19 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
8 General Aviation Accidents Involving Visual Flight Rules Right Into Instrument Meteoro-
logical Conditions, National Transportation Safety Board, Report No. NTSB/SR-89/
01, February 8, 1989, at i [hereinafter NTSB Report]. This report indicates that the
typical VFR-into-IFR conditions accident involves a 35 to 54-year-old non-instrument
rated private pilot who crashes his own single engine aircraft after encountering low
visibility conditions during daylight hours in the cruise portion of a pleasure flight.
Id. at 15, 17, 18, 21, 25. In most cases the pilot has less than 500 total hours, with less
than 200 hours in the type of aircraft involved and less than 10 hours of instrument
experience. Id. at 19-21, 23.
For a general discussion of the VFR-into-IFR accident, see Thomas A. Horne,
The VFR-Into-IMC Accident, AOPA PILOT, July 1993, at 111 ("[M]ost pilots know the
dangers of attempting VFR flight in instrument meteorological conditions. That
goes double for taking on low ceilings and visibilities without the benefit of an in-
strument rating."); Thomas A. Horne, VFR Into IMC, AOPA PILOT, January 1992, at
91 ("In most cases, the pilot has prior knowledge of the possibility of low visibilities
and/or ceilings from a preflight weather briefing."); John M. Likakis, VFR-to-IFR
Pilots Face Deadly Odds, AVIATION SAFETY, April 1, 1988, at 1 ("One of the most promi-
nent characteristics of the VFR-into-IFR accident is the propensity for pilots to press
on into the weather ... in full knowledge of the danger.").
1994]
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weather conditions requiring the application of Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR). During the past twenty years, only a
handful of cases have discussed the issue. As demonstrated
below, some of those cases have held that where the insur-
ance policy denies coverage if the pilot is not properly rated
for "the flight" involved, the weather conditions prevailing
at the time and place of departure will determine whether
the pilot was properly rated for the flight. Courts have
reached this conclusion even where the pilot, after a VFR
takeoff, encountered and crashed in IFR conditions. This
rule is known as the "inception rule."
The purpose of this article is to illustrate why the incep-
tion rule is an unsatisfactory resolution of the interpreta-
tional problem faced by the courts determining whether
the pilot is appropriately rated for the flight involved. The
article then proposes a different test for determining
whether the pilot was appropriately rated for the flight.
II. AVIATION RULES AND TERMINOLOGY
A brief discussion of some basic aviation regulations is es-
sential to understand the points raised in this article.
There are two primary sets of flight rules that govern civil
aviation operations in the United States: Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) 10 and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). I A pilot flying
under VFR is basically limited to flying in weather condi-
tions that allow one to navigate by visual references outside
of the cockpit, subject to federal regulations that set forth
certain minimum ceilings, distance from clouds, and visibil-
ity requirements for a given type of airspace.1 2  Weather
10 The phrase "Visual Flight Rules" is defined as "[r]ules that govern the proce-
dures for conducting flight under visual conditions. The term 'VFR' is also used in
the United States to indicate weather conditions that are equal to or greater than
minimum VFR requirements. In addition, it is used by pilots and controllers to indi-
cate type of flight plan." AIM, supra note 1, at V-2. See infra note 12.
11 See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
12 Federal Aviation Regulations provide:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and
§ 91.157, no person may operate an aircraft under VFR when the
flight visibility is less, or at a distance from clouds that is less, than that
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conditions equal to or better than the minimum for flight
prescribed for the corresponding altitude and class of airspace in the
following table:
Airspace Hight visibility Distance from clouds
Class A ................ Not Applicable .......... Not Applicable.
Class B ................ 3 statute miles .......... Clear of Clouds.
Class C ................ 3 statute miles .......... 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
Class D ............... 3 statute miles .......... 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
Class E: 500 feet below.
Less than 10,000 feet 3 statute miles .......... 1,000 feet above.
MSL ................. 2,000 feet horizontal.
At or above 10,000 feet 5 statute miles .......... 1,000 feet below.
MSL .................. 1,000 feet above.
I statute mile horizontal.
Class G:
1,200 feet or less above
the surface (regardless
of MSL altitude).
Day, except as provided I1 statute mile ........... Clear of clouds.
in § 91.155(b).
Night, except as 3 statute miles .......... 500 feet below.
provided in § 91.155(b). 1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
More than 1,200 feet
above the surface but
less than 10,000 feet
MSL.
Day .................. I statute mile ........... 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
Night ................ 3 statute miles .......... 500 feet below.
1,000 feet above.
2,000 feet horizontal.
More than 1,200 feet 5 statute miles .......... 1,000 feet below.
above the surface and at 1,000 feet above.
or above 10,000 feet 1 statute mile horizontal.
MSL.
(b) Class G Airspace. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion, the following operations may be conducted in Class G airspace below 1,200 feet
above the surface:
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under VFR are known as VFR conditions.1 3 The minimum
weather conditions for VFR flight may vary with the type of
airspace in which the pilot flies. For example, in most con-
trolled airspace, 14 flight visibility for the general aviation pi-
lot 5 must be three statute miles and the ceiling must be
1000 feet or greater for the pilot to operate under VFR.16
An exception to this rule allows certain flight in controlled
airspace to be conducted in weather conditions less than
the minimums required for flight under VFR. This excep-
(1) Helicopter. A helicopter may be operated clear of clouds if operated at a speed
that allows the pilot adequate opportunity to see any air traffic or obstruction in
time to avoid a collision.
(2) Airplane. When the visibility is less than 3 statute miles but not less than 1
statute mile during night hours, an airplane may be operated clear of clouds if oper-
ated in an airport traffic pattern within one-half mile of the runway.
(c) Except as provided in § 91.157, no person may operate an aircraft beneath
the ceiling under VFR within the lateral boundaries of controlled airspace desig-
nated to the surface for an airport when the ceiling is less than 1,000 feet.
(d) Except as provided in § 91.157 of this part, no person may take off or land an
aircraft, or enter the traffic pattern of an airport, under VFR, within the lateral
boundaries of the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E airspace
designated for an airport-
(1) Unless ground visibility at that airport is at least 3 statute miles; or
(2) If ground visibility is not reported at that airport, unless flight visibility during
landing or takeoff, or while operating in the traffic pattern is at least 3 statute miles.
(e) For the purpose of this section, an aircraft operating at the base altitude of a
Class E airspace area is considered to be within the airspace directly below that area.
14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (1993).
The above rules must also be read in conjunction with the regulations that pro-
vide the minimum safe altitudes for flights over congested areas or other than con-
gested areas. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (1993). See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.515 (1993)
(certain large and turbojet powered aircraft may not be operated under VFR at less
than 1000 feet above the surface, or 1000 feet from any mountain, hill, or other
obstruction to flight, for day operations, unless necessary for takeoff or landing).
13 AIM, supra note 1, at V-1. VFR conditions are also known as Visual Meteorologi-
cal Conditions or VMC. Id. at V-3.
14 Controlled airspace is that airspace designated as Class A, B, C, D, or E airspace
within which some or all traffic may be subject to air traffic control. AIM, supra note
1, at C-4.
15 See supra note 1. This article is designed to address the coverage issues facing
the general aviation pilot operating under 14 C.F.R. § 91. Note that the VFR re-
quirements for commercial and air taxi operators are different and are governed by
14 C.F.R. § 135.205, but the analysis is similar. Air carrier operations are governed
by the plethora of regulations found at 14 C.F.R. § 121.
16 14 C.F.R. § 91.155(a), (c) (1993).
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tion is known as "special VFR weather minimums. ' 17 In un-
controlled airspace, 8 however, the pilot must maintain at
least one statute mile flight visibility and remain clear of the
clouds to fly under VFR during the day.1"
Weather conditions that do not satisfy the minimum cri-
teria for flight under VFR are referred to as IFR condi-
tions. 20  For example, flight in clouds is almost always
considered to be IFR conditions because there are virtually
no visual references outside of the cockpit. Essentially, a
person may not pilot an aircraft in weather conditions less
than the minimum prescribed for VFR flight unless he
holds an instrument rating.2 1 Pilots who have a valid and
current22 instrument rating may operate aircraft in weather
conditions which preclude flight under VFR. An instru-
17 Special VFR weather minimums allow a non-instrument rated pilot to fly within
the lateral boundaries of controlled airspace during the day with at least one statute
mile flight visibility (1) so long as he has received a clearance from air traffic control
to do so, and (2) so long as he remains clear of the clouds. Special VFR at night
requires the pilot to possess an instrument rating. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.157 (1993).
Regarding the effect of special VFR weather minimums on the coverage issues raised
in this article, see Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 286 N.W.2d 437 (Neb.
1979), wherein the court interpreted the phrase "Visual Flight Rules" in the insur-
ance policy to include basic and special VFR conditions.
18 Uncontrolled airspace is essentially that airspace that has not been designated
as controlled airspace and within which air traffic control has neither the authority
nor the responsibility for exercising control over air traffic. AIM, supra note 1, at U-
1.
19 14 CF.R. § 91.155(a) (1993). Note that VFR flight in uncontrolled airspace at
night requires three statute miles visibility and requires the same ceiling and visibil-
ity requirements as VFR flight in controlled airspace during the day under 10,000
feet mean sea level.
20 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1993). IFR conditions are also referred to as Instrument Mete-
orological Conditions (IMC). IMC are "conditions expressed in terms of visibility,
distance from cloud, and ceiling less than the minima specified for visual meteoro-
logical conditions." AIM, supra note 1, at 1-2.
21 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(e) (1993).
- Federal Aviation Regulations provide that:
No pilot may act as pilot in command under IFR, nor in weather con-
ditions less than the minimums prescribed for VFR, unless he has,
within the past 6 calendar months-
(i) In the case of an aircraft other than a glider, logged at least 6
hours of instrument time under actual or simulated IFR conditions, at
least 3 of which were in flight in the category of aircraft involved, in-
cluding at least 6 instrument approaches, or passed an instrument
competency check in the category of aircraft involved.
14 C.F.R. § 61.57(e)(1) (1993).
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ment-rated pilot has received certain additional training
which allows her to maneuver the aircraft solely by refer-
ence to instruments and gauges inside the cockpit.2 3 Flight
This article does not address whether an instrument-rated pilot who flies in IFR
conditions is appropriately rated for the flight if he fails to comply with the above
requirements.
23 Federal Aviation Regulations provide:
(a) General To be eligible for an instrument rating (airplane) or an
instrument rating (helicopter), an applicant must-
(1) Hold at least a current private pilot certificate with an aircraft
rating appropriate to the instrument rating sought;
(2) Be able to read, speak, and understand the English language;
and
(3) Comply with the applicable requirements of this section.
(b) Ground instruction. An applicant for the written test for an in-
strument rating must have received ground instruction, or have
logged home study in at least the following areas of aeronautical
knowledge appropriate to the rating sought.
(1) The regulations of this chapter that apply to flight under IFR
conditions, the Airman's Information Manual, and the IFR air traffic
system and procedures;
(2) Dead reckoning appropriate to IFR navigation, IFR navigation
by radio aids using the VOR, ADF, and ILS systems, and the use of IFR
charts and instrument approach plates;
(3) The procurement and use of aviation weather reports and fore-
casts, and the elements of forecasting weather trends on the basis of
that information and personal observation of weather conditions; and
(4) The safe and efficient operation of airplanes or helicopters, as
appropriate, under instrument weather conditions.
(c) Night instruction and skill-airplanes. An applicant for the flight
test for an instrument rating (airplane) must present a logbook record
certified by an authorized flight instructor showing that he has re-
ceived instrument flight instruction in an airplane in the following pi-
lot operations, and has been found competent in each of them:
(1) Control and accurate maneuvering of an airplane solely by ref-
erence to instruments.
(2) IFR navigation by the use of the VOR and ADF systems, includ-
ing compliance with air traffic control instructions and procedures.
(3) Instrument approaches to published minimums using the VOR,
ADF, and ILS systems (instruction in the use of the ADF and ILS may
be received in an instrument ground trainer and instruction in the use
of the ILS glide slope may be received in an airborne ILS simulator).
(4) Cross-country flying in simulated or actual IFR conditions, on
Federal airways or as routed by ATC, including one such trip of at least
250 nautical miles, including VOR, ADF, and ILS approaches at differ-
ent airports.
(5) Simulated emergencies, including the recovery from unusual
attitudes, equipment or instrument malfunctions, loss of communica-
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in IFR conditions in controlled airspace is conducted under
Instrument Flight Rules,24 and requires the pilot both to
file an IFR flight plan and to receive a clearance from an air
traffic control facility. 25 No clearance is required for most
domestic flights under VFR. With the exception of certain
minimum weather requirements for landing, there are vir-
tually no ceiling or visibility requirements for the typical
general aviation pilot flying en route under IFR.26
The VFR-to-IFR accident typically occurs when the pilot
loses outside visual references upon encountering adverse
weather conditions, is unable to control the aircraft solely
by reference to his instruments, and becomes spatially
disoriented.
dons, and engine-out emergencies if a multiengine airplane is used,
and missed approach procedure.
(e) Flight experience. An applicant for an instrument rating must
have at least the following flight time as a pilot:
(1) A total of 125 hours of pilot flight time, of which 50 hours are as
pilot in command in cross-country flight in a powered aircraft with
other than a student pilot certificate. Each cross-country flight must
have a landing at a point more than 50 nautical miles from the origi-
nal departure point.
(2) 40 hours of simulated or actual instrument time, of which not
more than 20 hours may be instrument instruction by an authorized
instructor in an instrument ground trainer acceptable to the
Administrator.
(3) 15 hours of instrument flight instruction by an authorized flight
instructor, including at least 5 hours in an airplane or a helicopter, as
appropriate.
(f) Written test. An applicant for an instrument rating must pass a
written test appropriate to the instrument rating sought on the sub-
jects in which ground instruction is required by paragraph (b) of this
section.
(g) Practical test. An applicant for an instrument rating must pass a
flight test in an airplane or a helicopter, as appropriate. The test must
include instrument flight procedures selected by the inspector or ex-
aminer conducting the test to determine the applicant's ability to per-
form competently the IFR operations on which instruction is required
by paragraph (c) or (d) of this section.
14 C.F.R. § 61.65 (1993)
24 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.167-91.193 (1993).
2.5 14 C.F.R. § 91.173 (1993).
26 However, certain commercial, air taxi, and air carrier flights may have some
visibility restrictions for takeoff. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 121 and § 135.
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Since an understanding of the weather is essential for pi-
lots, federal regulations require pilots to obtain instruction
before they receive a license on how to procure and use
aeronautical weather reports and forecasts. 2 7 Pilot appli-
cants also must receive instruction regarding the recogni-
tion of critical weather conditions both from the ground
and in flight.28 Federal regulations also require a pilot to
obtain a weather briefing before each flight.29 Thus, to de-
termine whether the weather conditions at departure, en
route, or at the destination will require the flight to be con-
ducted under IFR or VFR, the pilot typically obtains a pref-
light weather briefing from a Federal Aviation
Administration Flight Service Station (FSS) briefer. 0
Weather briefings are available from a FSS twenty-four
hours a day through the use of a toll-free telephone
number,3' and personal visits to a FSS for a briefing are pos-
sible at some airports. Various computer software now en-
ables pilots to obtain their briefings through personal
computers.3 2
27 14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a) (3) (1993).
28 Id.
2 14 C.F.R. § 91.103(a) (1993).
50 Flight Service Stations are air traffic facilities that "provide pilot briefing, en
route communications and VFR search and rescue services, assist lost aircraft and
aircraft in emergency situations, relay [air traffic control] clearances, originate No-
tices to Airmen, broadcast aviation weather and NAS information, receive and pro-
cess IFR flight plans, and monitor [navigational facilities]." Selected FSSs provide En
route Flight Advisory Service, known as Flight Watch, take weather observations, is-
sue airport advisories, and advise Customs and Immigration of transborder flights.
AIM, supra note 1, at F-3.
More than half of the pilots involved in the 361 VFR-to-IFR accidents between
1983 and 1987 obtained a weather briefing from a Flight Service Station. NTSB
Report, supra note 8, at 24.
-1 The nearest FSS can be reached at 1-800-WX BRIEF (1-800-992-7433).
22 One such program is the Contel DUATS (Direct User Access Terminal System).
This program allows a pilot to obtain weather briefings via personal computer for a
route or destination, including current and forecast conditions as well as pilot re-
ports (PIREPS), Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMETS), see infra note
75, and a host of color weather graphics including radar displays for virtually any
location in the United States.
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Though not authorized to make original forecasts,33 FSS
specialists are qualified and certificated by the National
Weather Service as Pilot Weather Briefers and are author-
ized to translate and interpret available weather data and
forecasts in terms of describing weather conditions a pilot
might expect along the route and at the destination.3 4 The
FSS briefer obtains his weather information from the Na-
tional Weather Service in Kansas City, Missouri. The
weather briefer typically provides a pilot with current and
forecast weather conditions for the departure, en route,
and destination areas. Information on upper air winds, sat-
ellite imagery, and radar data for precipitation location and
intensity is also available. If the current or forecast weather
conditions for the flight are at or below VFR minimums,
the FSS briefer may issue a "VFR Not Recommended" advi-
sory to the pilot.3 5
Pilots also have the ability to obtain weather information
en route by communicating with a FSS briefer on one of
the many frequencies listed on the navigational chart typi-
cally used by the VFR pilot. Flight Service Stations also pro-
vide En route Flight Advisory Service (EFAS), also known as
"Flight Watch," specifically designed to provide en route
aircraft with updated weather advisories pertinent to the
flight.36 All EFAS facilities have equipment to access the ra-
dar displays directly from each of the fifty-six National
Weather Service radar sites which detect the coverage, in-
33 Aviation forecasts are prepared by 52 Weather Service Forecast Offices
(WSFOs), which prepare terminal and route forecasts. Terminal forecasts are issued
three times daily for specific airports in the 50 states and are valid for 24 hours. The
last six hours of the 24-hour period are given in a categorical outlook as either LIFR
(Low IFR), IFR, MVFR (Marginal VFR), or VFR. Route forecasts are issued in the
morning and mid-day and are valid for 12 hours. Area forecasts, issued by the Na-
tional Aviation Weather Advisory Unit in Kansas City, are issued three times daily.
AIM, supra note 1, 7-1(b).
14 AIM, supra note 1, 7-3(a).
35 AIM, supra note 1, at V-1. Such an advisory does not abrogate the pilot's au-
thority to make his own decision. Id.
56 AIM, supra note 1, 7-4. Flight Watch can be contacted by pilots in flight by
selecting 122.0 mhz on the pilot's communication radio, id., while standard Flight
Service Stations are usually available on 122.2 mhz or as otherwise indicated on the
navigational chart for the particular geographic location.
1994]
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tensity and movement of precipitation. 37 Furthermore, se-
lected FSS locations provide Transcribed Weather
Broadcast (TWEB), which is tape-recorded meteorological
and aeronautical data broadcast continuously over selected
low-frequency navigational aids accessible on the pilot's
navigation radios.18
III. POLICY LANGUAGE
With this basic aviation background in mind, we next
look to the language of the typical aviation liability insur-
ance policy. Though policy language varies among insur-
ers, the following policy language is similar to that found in
many of today's aviation liability policies and is typical of
the varied provisions that have been the subject of "incep-
tion rule" decisions: "This policy applies when the aircraft is
in flight and only when being operated by pilots holding an
FAA pilot certificate while properly rated for the flight and the
aircraft . . . "or, as stated in some policies, "with ratings as
required by the FAA for the flight involved."
There can be little dispute that, in general, the above
provision conveys the insurer's intent to provide coverage
only when the pilot flies in conditions for which he is "prop-
erly rated." Insurers, therefore, typically argue that a non-
instrument rated pilot is not "properly rated" if he flies into
weather conditions below those required for VFR flight. In-
sureds, on the other hand, argue that the phrase "the
flight" is ambiguous because the phrase is usually defined
in the policy as the point when the takeoff roll begins until
the point when the landing roll has been completed. In-
sureds argue that insurers cannot assume that one was not
properly rated for a segment of the flight if the policy de-
fines flight as a whole and if the pilot commenced the take-
off roll in VFR conditions. As demonstrated below, some
courts have agreed with the insureds and have held that the
weather conditions existing at the time of take-off are dis-
-1 AIM, supra note 1, 7-11(a),(c).
m AIM, supra note 1, 7-8. The typical TWEB contains specially prepared NWS
forecasts, in-flight advisories, winds aloft, and current weather reports. Id
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positive; as long as the pilot is duly qualified to fly in take-
off conditions, the courts will be consider him "properly
rated for .the flight."
IV. CASES DISCUSSING THE RATED-FOR-FLIGHT
ISSUE
Relatively few cases have discussed whether a pilot was
properly rated for the flight. A chronological review of
each of the most relevant cases appears below to provide
some insight on how courts have handled the issue,39 and a
table summarizing the holdings of each case appears in Ap-
pendix A.
A. THE KNrG CRAFT CASE
In National Insurance Undemiters v. King Craft Custom
Products, Inc.4" the aircraft crashed shortly after the non-in-
strument rated pilot received an IFR clearance to land in
IFR conditions. The insurer argued that no coverage ex-
isted for the loss because of the policy's requirement that
the pilot be "properly rated for the flight." The court noted
that the weather was VFR for the entire first leg of the trip
(Miami to Panama City), that the pilot was told when de-
parting Miami that the weather at his ultimate destination
(Mobile) was VFR, that his landing at and subsequent take-
off from Panama City was VFR, that the pilot responded
"negative" to the Mobile tower controller's inquiry whether
the pilot was IFR, and that the pilot did not file an IFR
flight plan. Rejecting the insurer's argument, the court
held that the pilot was properly rated for the flight despite
the court's apparent acknowledgment that the pilot was at-
- This article does not purport to contain an exhaustive compilation of the deci-
sions which discuss whether a non-instrument rated pilot was covered for flight into
IFR conditions. Rather, the article is meant to analyze the cases that discuss the
inception rule and/or the issues associated with the policy language at issue in this
article. The notes contain cites of additional cases related to the IFR/VFR issue that
contain policy language different from that discussed in Parts III and IV of the text.
See infra notes 44 and 128. The author apologizes for omitting any relevant case not
disclosed by research.
-o 368 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ala. 1973), affd, 488 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1974).
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tempting to land in weather conditions for which he was
not properly rated.41
The court observed that if the insurer's argument were
accepted, the court would have to "break a flight into seg-
ments and treat the abortive attempt to land under unfavor-
able emerging weather conditions as a 'flight' requiring
(for coverage) an instrument rating."4 2 In order to avoid
"coverage during a particular flight flickering on and off as
particular weather conditions were encountered," the court
refused to segment the flight in that manner.43 More im-
portantly, the court noted that the insurer in another policy
had used language that presumably excluded coverage
under IFR conditions unless the pilot possessed an instru-
ment rating. 44
The court also refused to consider the insurer's evidence
that the pilot knowingly attempted to land in IFR condi-
tions when other options were available to the pilot. The
reason for such refusal was that otherwise the court would
have been forced to interpret the policy to except from cov-
erage any loss that occurs under circumstances beyond the
pilot's control. Consequently, the court held that the pilot
was properly rated for the flight and coverage was afforded
under the policy.45
B. THE GLOVER TEST
Four years later, the inception rule was announced by a
Texas court finding that coverage applied where a non-in-
strument rated pilot departed in VFR conditions, encoun-
41 Id. at 478:
42 Id.
43 Id. at 479.
44 Id. The language referred to by the court was chosen by the same insurer in
other policies. The exclusion in those policies stated that the policy does not apply
"under Instrument Flight Rule(s) (IFR) conditions unless the pilot possesses a valid
Instrument rating . . . ." This language was discussed by the courts in Tuohey v.
National Ins. Underwriters, 369 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) and National Ins.
Underwriters v. Matthews, 418 S.w.2d 391 (Ark. 1967). In each of those cases, the
court held that the insurer failed to meet its burden of proving that the pilot flew
into IFR conditions.
45 King Craft, 368 F. Supp. at 478, 480.
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tered IFR conditions during the last one-third of the flight,
and crashed in IFR conditions.46 In Glover v. National Insur-
ance Underwriters the pilot was told during his weather brief-
ing one hour before take-off that the weather at his
destination was IFR but was forecast to improve to VFR con-
ditions. Like the policy in King Craft, the. Glover policy
stated that coverage would not apply unless the pilot was
"properly rated for theflight and the aircraft."47 The insurer
argued that "the flight" at issue was an IFR flight for which
the pilot was not properly rated.
To determine whether the pilot was properly rated for
the flight, the Glover court focused on the phrase "the
flight" in the policy. The court found that the phrase was
ambiguous because the insurer knew of certain language
not used in the policy that clearly would have excluded cov-
erage for non-instrument rated pilots who fly in IFR
conditions.48
The court also found the phrase "the flight" to be ambig-
uous because it was subject to several interpretations.49
One interpretation of the phrase would determine that the
flight was VFR or IFR depending upon the conduct of the
pilot. If the pilot used her vision to maintain the attitude of
the aircraft, the flight was VFR; but if she used her instru-
ments to maintain altitude, attitude, velocity, and course,
the flight was IFR. In other words, if the pilot was attempt-
ing to fly the aircraft visually, presumably by looking outside
the aircraft, then the flight was VFR even if visibility outside
the aircraft was zero. This logic is contrary to the defini-
tions of VFR flight contained in the Federal Aviation
Regulations.10
Another interpretation, according to the court, was that
the flight is considered IFR if conducted in accord with in-
.6 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
47 Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
48 Although the court did not elaborate on the specific language the insurer knew
but failed to select, the court was likely referring to the same language referred to by
the King Craft court, in supra note 44.
49 Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761-62.
o See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1993).
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strument flight rules. Presumably, if a pilot flew at IFR alti-
tudes51 or filed an IFR flight plan, the flight was IFR. Yet
another interpretation was that the flight was VFR if con-
ducted pursuant to visual flight rules. If the flight was con-
ducted in violation of visual flight rules, the flight was an
IFR flight.
After considering these various interpretations, the Glover
court embraced the interpretation adopted in King Craft.
The Glover court held that "the flight" refers "to the entire
time the aircraft is in flight; and 'the flight' must be looked
at as a whole, rather than in segments, in determining its
IFR or VFR character."5 2 Mysteriously, and without analysis,
the court held that the flight should be characterized as of
its inception; the weather conditions that exist at the begin-
ning of the flight govern whether the flight is a VFR or an
IFR flight.5 3 Noting that the parties stipulated that the first
one-third of the flight, including the departure, was con-
ducted in VFR conditions, the court held that coverage ap-
plied because the pilot embarked on a VFR flight and was
properly rated to fly VFR1*
In dicta, the court refused, for two reasons, to consider as
controlling the pilot's knowledge at takeoff of the en route
or destination weather conditions in determining whether
the flight was IFR or VFR. First, the court surmised that few
pilots actually know at the time of departure the weather
conditions they will encounter later in the flight.55 Second,
the court was concerned that placing at issue the pilot's
knowledge of the destination weather conditions would
cause the court to question the reasonableness of the pilot's
actions that, in the court's opinion, "might best be ignored
51 When flying in cruise flight under IFR in uncontrolled airspace below 18,000
feet, pilots are required to fly at odd-thousand foot mean sea level altitudes (such as
5000, 7000, etc.) on magnetic courses from 0 to 179 degrees, and even thousand-
foot mean sea level altitudes on magnetic courses from 180 to 359 degrees. 14
C.F.R. § 91.179(b) (1993).
52 Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 762.




in determining the coverage of an insurance policy
designed to protect one from the consequences of one's
own negligence ... .-"56 The court noted that, even if the
pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions were consid-
ered, the facts showed that the pilot was not aware when he
departed that he would encounter IFR conditions.5
The two dissenting justices questioned the majority's
logic of looking at the flight as a whole based upon the
weather conditions at the inception of the flight in light of
the policy's definition of "flight." Since the policy defined
"flight" as occurring from the time the aircraft moves for-
ward in taking off until the aircraft completes its landing,
the dissenters concluded that the policy required the pilot
to be rated for all segments of the flight. They noted that
the pilot flew into IFR conditions of which he had been pre-
viously advised, continued his flight in those conditions in-
stead of turning back to better weather, and crashed in IFR
conditions.58  Consequently, the dissenting justices would
have held that the pilot was not properly rated for the
flight.5 9
C. THE JIM HA W CASE
Not all courts confronting the IFR/VFR issue have
adopted Glover's inception rule. Almost two years after
Glover, the Supreme Court of Iowa decided fim Hawk Chevro-
let-Buick, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,6° wherein the
student pilot 6 crashed one-half mile from the airport after
56Id
57 Id
-m Id. at 765.
59i&
6o 270 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1978).
61 The requirements for issuance of a student pilot certificate are set forth in 14
C.F.R. §§ 61.81-61.95 (1993). In general, the student pilot certificate differs from
the private pilot certificate in that the student pilot cannot carry passengers (14
C.F.R. § 61.89 (a) (1)), must have a minimum of three statute miles surface visibility
during the day (five statute miles at night) in any airspace (14 C.F.R. § 61.89 (a) (6)),
must maintain visual contact with the surface (14 C.F.R § 61.89 (a) (7)), and may not
fly beyond a 25-mile radius of the departure airport without a flight instructor's
endorsement (14 C.F.R. § 61.93). Other limitations are described in 14 C.F.R.
§§ 61.81-61.95.
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departing into a rainy and foggy night with a 600-foot ceil-
ing. The policy at issue required the pilot to have "a valid
pilot's certificate with ratings and certificates appropriate
for the flight and the aircraft as required by the Federal
Aviation Administration .... "62 The court observed that
the above language "plainly states" that insurance does not
apply unless the pilot is appropriately rated.63 Noting that
the pilot was not rated for IFR flight, the court held that
when the pilot flew within his ratings, the aircraft was in-
sured, but when he flew beyond his ratings, the aircraft was
not insured.64 The court reasoned that an insurer does not
act unreasonably if it limits its risk to flight within the pilot's
ratings and requires its insured to fly within those ratings
for insurance coverage to apply. Thus, the court held that
the policy did not apply at the time of the crash.65 In reach-
ing its decision, the court made no reference to the incep-
tion rule, presumably because it found no ambiguity in the
policy language.66
D. THE NORTIIHWESTERN FLYERS CASE
Despite its acknowledgment that federal regulations re-
quire flight above 18,000 feet to be conducted under IFR,67
the court in Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Manufactur-
ing Co., Inc.6' held that the non-instrument rated pilot was
62 Jim Hawk, 270 N.W.2d at 467.
63 Id. at 468.
C Id.
65 Id.
- It is likely that the court would have reached the same result had it applied the
inception rule because the evidence suggested, although it is not entirely clear from
the case, that the conditions were IFR at the time and place of departure. The
court's acknowledgement of clear policy language, however, coupled with the
court's comment that no coverage applies when the pilot flies beyond his ratings,
suggests that the court would not have accepted the inception rule, even if the air-
craft had crashed much later in the flight.
617 Federal Aviation Regulations define airspace within 12 nautical miles of the
coast of the 48 contiguous States between 18,000 feet MSL to and including 60,000
feet MSL to be Class A airspace. 14 C.F.R. § 71.33(a) (1993). In general, persons
flying in Class A airspace must conduct the flight under instrument flight rules. 14
C.F.R. § 91.135 (1993).




appropriately rated for the flight in which he crashed after
losing control of the aircraft at an altitude of 23,000 feet.69
After distinguishing fim Hawk by pointing out that the pilot
in that case departed in IFR conditions, the court followed
the King Craft and Glover rationale and concluded that the
flight was a VFR flight because the flight began in VFR con-
ditions. The court rejected the insurer's argument that the
pilot chose to fly in, as opposed to inadvertently encoun-
tered, airspace that required an instrument rating.
The policy language at issue in Northwestern Flyers was sim-
ilar to the language construed in King Craft and Glover. Rec-
ognizing that an insurer has a duty to use clear and explicit
language, the court held that the insurer knew how to ex-
clude coverage for this type of occurrence but failed to use
the requisite language in the policy.71
E. THE MAIR ' SHORT STOP TEST
Two years after Northwestern Flyers, one of the dissenting
justices in Glover authored the majority opinion in United
States Fire Insurance Co. v. Marr's Short Stop7 2 with predictably
different results. In Marr's, the aviation liability policy ap-
plied only to occurrences while the aircraft was operated by
"pilots holding valid and effective pilot and medical certifi-
cates with ratings as required by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration for the flight involved."73 After receiving at
least two weather briefings advising him of the existence of
IFR conditions along his flight route, the non-instrument
rated pilot filed an IFR flight plan.74 As the pilot was taxi-
ing to the runway, air traffic control broadcast a convective
- Id. at 1274.
70 Id. at 1273.
71 Id. at 1273-74. The court suggested that an exclusion for flights conducted in
violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations governing instrument flight would be
clearer. Id. at 1273 n.23.
72 680 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1984).
73 Id
74 Regulations prohibit a pilot from flying in controlled airspace under IFR unless
that person has filed an IFR flight plan and received an appropriate clearance from
air traffic control. 14 C.F.R. § 91.173 (1993).
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SIGMET 75 that covered the pilot's intended flight path.
The aircraft departed into a 1000-foot overcast ceiling with
one mile visibility in heavy rain and fog, and then crashed
fifteen miles from the airport prior to reaching its assigned
altitude. The weather at the time and place of the accident
was overcast and rainy.
Even though the jury refused to find that IFR conditions
existed at the flight's inception, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of the insurer on the basis of the jury's
finding that the pilot knew at the beginning of the flight
that he would be flying in IFR conditions. The court of ap-
peals, after applying Glover's inception rule to the jury's
finding that VFR conditions prevailed at the time and place
of departure, reversed the trial court's judgment. 76
The Supreme Court of Texas held that the court of ap-
peals erred in applying Glover by ignoring the jury's finding
that the pilot knew he would be flying in IFR conditions."
The court noted that the pilot's act of "filing the [IFR flight]
plan is a believable circumstance that he knew the weather
conditions were IFR."78 The court, therefore, found that
the pilot was not appropriately rated for the flight. The
court apparently distinguished the case from Glover on the
grounds that, in applying the inception rule, the Glover
court acknowledged that the pilot "did not know when he
took off that he was flying into IFR weather." 79 Thus, Marr's
implies that the pilot's knowledge of the impending
weather conditions is a factor to consider in applying the
inception rule.
75 A SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information) is a weather advisory con-
cerning weather significant to the safety of all aircraft. SIGMET advisories cover
severe and extreme turbulence, severe icing, and widespread dust or sandstorms
which reduce visibility to less than three miles. A convective SIGMET is issued for
tornadoes, lines of thunderstorms, embedded thunderstorms of any intensity level,
areas of level four or greater thunderstorms with an area coverage of 40% or more,
and hail 3/4 inch or greater. AIM, supra note 1, at C-5, S-2.
76 Marr's Short Stop v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 643 S.w.2d 514 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 1982), rev'd, 680 S.w.2d 3 (Tex. 1984).
77 Marr's Short Stop, 680 S.W.2d at 6.
78 Id at 5.
79 Id. at 6 (quoting Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 763).
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The concurring opinion in Marr's proposed the following
test to resolve the confusion over whether the flight is IFR
or VFR:
The determination of whether a flight is IFR or VFR should
be made by the trier of fact on the basis of weather reports
and forecasts of the expected weather conditions along the
entire plan of flight which were available to the pilot at the
time and place of departure. If the forecasts indicate that
the pilot must fly through IFR conditions to reach his desti-
nation, it is an IFR flight.
Obviously, if there is an expected IFR thunderstorm at
the time and place of destination and this information is
available at the time of departure, the flight should not be
categorized as VFR, irrespective of what the weather is at
departure. The pilot's knowledge should not be the con-
trolling factor because the conditions of the flight are con-
trolled by the weather and not by the pilot's beliefs.80
F. THE ANDERSEN CASE
The Marr's concurring opinion was adopted by the court
in Security Insurance Co. v. Andersen,81 wherein the non-in-
strument rated pilot departed in VFR conditions but later
crashed in IFR conditions (500-foot ceiling, one quarter-
mile visibility). The policy in Andersen required the aircraft
to be piloted by a person "properly certificated, rated, and
qualified under the current applicable Federal Air Regula-
tions for the operation involved." Based on the Glover incep-
tion rule, the trial court ruled that the pilot was
appropriately rated for the flight because he took off in
VFR conditions. On appeal, however, the court adopted
the concurring opinion in Marr's Short Stop which requires
the trier of fact to consider the weather reports and fore-
casts available to the pilot at the time and place of depar-
'o Marr's Short Stop, 680 S.W.2d at 6-7 (Spears, J., concurring). The concurring
opinion also stated that the claimant should have the burden of proving that his
failure to comply with the terms of the contract did not contribute to the loss. Id. at
7.
81 763 P.2d 251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), vacated in part on other grounds, 763 P.2d 246
(Ariz. 1988).
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ture. The appellate court believed that the Marr's
concurrence avoids the injustice of characterizing a flight as
VFR based on weather conditions at the inception of flight
when the pilot could reasonably have anticipated IFR con-
ditions en route.82 The court reversed and remanded the
case for a determination of whether the pilot could reason-
ably have anticipated IFR conditions en route.8" The
Supreme Court of Arizona vacated portions of the court of
appeals' opinion for reasons unrelated to the IFR/VFR
issue.84
G. THE IDEAL MUTUAL CASE
The Fifth Circuit confronted the issue in Ideal Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Myers.8 5 In Ideal Mutual the pilot and his pas-
senger were killed when their aircraft crashed shortly after
takeoff. The policy at issue did not apply to any occurrence
unless the pilot held a valid certificate "with ratings as re-
quired by the Federal Aviation Administration for the flight
involved."8 6 On the basis of eyewitness testimony that fog
restricted visibility to less than a quarter of a mile at the
departure airport, and the pilot's failure to hold an instru-
ment rating, the insurer moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the pilot was not properly rated for the
flight. The trial court ruled in favor of the insurer.
The court of appeals opined that Glover and Marr's re-
quire the court to consider pilot knowledge of the weather
conditions as a factor in determining whether the flight was
VFR or IFR under the inception rule.87 Looking at the evi-
dence before it, the court held that the trial court should
82 763 P.2d at 261.
:3 Id. at 262.
84 Security Ins. Co. v. Andersen, 763 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1988). The Supreme Court
of Arizona vacated the court of appeals' opinion only to the extent that it required
proof of a causal connection between the accident and the pilot's failure to have a
valid medical certificate in order for the insurer to avoid coverage. The appellate
court opinion is cited in the text to provide the reader with the court's analysis of
the rated-for-flight issue, which presumably remains good law. Id. at 249.
85 789 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.4 (5th Cir. 1986).
86 Id. at 1203-04.
87 Id. at 1204.
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have discredited the eyewitness testimony because none of
those witnesses were at the airport at the precise time of
departure and crash. 8  Somewhat inconsistently, however,
the court then observed that, during his weather briefing
over one hour before takeoff, the pilot was told that VFR
weather conditions would exist for the flight. The court
concluded that a genuine issue of fact existed as to the
weather conditions and the pilot's knowledge of those con-
ditions, and, therefore, reversed the order of summary
judgment.89
H. THE TRANSPORT IAEMNITY CASE
In Transport Indemnity Co. v. Sky-Kraft, Inc.9° the pilot ob-
tained a preflight weather briefing indicating that the
weather conditions near his place of departure were "margi-
nal VFR." After filing a VFR flight plan, the non-instrument
rated pilot departed but crashed shortly after takeoff, at
which time the weather conditions just four miles from the
place of departure had deteriorated to IFR conditions. The
decedent's estate filed a wrongful death action against the
fixed base operator (FBO) who had rented the aircraft to
the pilot. The FBO's insurer then sought a declaration that
no coverage existed for the loss under its aircraft liability
policy. The policy at issue in the case stated that "coverage
shall not apply while the aircraft is operated in flight by
other than the following pilots ... who are properly rated
for the flight involved." The insurer claimed the pilot was
not properly rated for the IFR flight because he did not
have an instrument rating. The pilot's estate claimed cover-
age applied because the weather conditions were suitable
for VFR flight at the time of takeoff. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insured.
The appellate court noted that the dispositive issue was
whether the flight should be characterized as IFR or VFR.91
- Id at 1205.
89Id
740 P.2d 319 (Wash. App. 1987).
Id. at 323.
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The court reviewed and accepted the King Craft and Glover
inception rule rationale because it provides "a means to de-
termine the character of a flight without resort to [the]
speculation or conjecture [associated with the] segmented
flight analysis." 92 Rejecting the Marr's consideration of pilot
knowledge of the weather conditions, the court refused to
characterize the flight based on the pilot's knowledge of
the weather conditions existing along his flight path or at
his destination, holding that such a test "would require this
court to adopt the precepts of negligence law for a cause of
action arising out of contract construction, without any
showing of causation between the pilot's knowledge or lack
of knowledge and the crash. 93 The court then held that
the flight should be characterized solely by the weather con-
ditions existing at the departure point. 4
The puzzling aspect of the Transport Indemnity logic is
that the court reversed the trial court's summary judgment
in favor of the insured and remanded the case for trial on
the issue of whether the weather conditions existing at the
point of departure were VFR or IFR.95 The record on ap-
peal failed to establish the weather conditions that pre-
vailed over the departure airport at the time of departure.
All of the available weather data apparently was from the
Portland International Airport, but the aircraft departed
the Pearson Airpark. The difference is that the Portland
airport had its own weather observation facility based at the
airport; the Pearson Airpark did not.96 Thus, there was
probably little, if any, chance of establishing the precise
weather conditions existing at the time and place of depar-
ture without forcing the trial court, on remand, to resort to
92 Id. at 324.
93 Id. at 326.
9 Id.
95 Transport Indemnity, 740 P.2d at 326.




the very "speculation or conjecture" the court hoped to
avoid by following the King Craft and Glover decisions.97
I. THE ZUwER CASE
Transport Indemnity was the foundation for the Supreme
Court of Washington's decision in National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Zuver.9s In Zuver another non-instrument rated
pilot crashed in IFR conditions.99 The policy in Zuver con-
tained a clause excluding coverage if the aircraft was flown
by a pilot not properly rated "for the operation involved."
The policy also contained a pilot warranty endorsement
stating that the policy applies only when the pilot possesses
the ratings appropriate "for the flight involved." Both the
trial court and the court of appeals found in favor of the
insurer on the grounds that the pilot was not properly rated
for the flight.100
Concluding that the phrase "operation involved" was am-
biguous and construing the phrase to relate to the entire
flight as a whole from its inception, the Supreme Court of
Washington found solace in the Transport Indemnity deci-
sion 01 and adopted the "inception rule" of King Craft and
Glover. Noting that the pilot departed in VFR conditions,
the court reversed the court of appeals and found coverage
in favor of the pilot's estate.102
Observing that weather forecasts are not absolute, the
Zuver court sensed that unfairness would occur if a VFR pi-
97 In reaching its decision to remand the case, the court also noted that the rec-
ord established only that the pilot "knew" the weather at the time of his preflight
briefing was marginal VFR; the record did not demonstrate that the pilot received
any information describing the Portland weather as IFR. That the court deemed
this information noteworthy is interesting in light of its earlier questioning of the
relevance of the pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions.
750 P.2d 1247 (Wash. 1988).
- Apparently, no witnesses testified to the exact weather conditions at the time
and place of the accident. The trial court, however, held that, more probably than
not, the pilot crashed in IFR conditions. Id. at 1249.
100 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Zuver, 736 P.2d 675 (Wash. App. 1987).
1o The fact that Zuver relied heavily on Transport Indemnity is not surprising since
Transport Indemnity was authored by a Washington supreme court justice sitting as
judge pro tempore of the Washington Court of Appeals.
"o Zuver, 750 P.2d at 1249-50.
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lot lost coverage after suddenly encountering IFR condi-
tions during a flight from Bellingham to Olympia,
Washington. The court held that "it is the weather condi-
tions at the time and place of departure which are
controlling."0 3
In a concurring opinion written by Justice Goodloe, four
justices disputed the majority's exclusion from considera-
tion the pilot's knowledge prior to takeoff about the
weather conditions to be expected en route. 10 4
J. THE A/4RK CASE
The most recent case discussing the IFR/VFR issue is Na-
tional Insurance Underwriters v. Mark,10 5 in which the non-in-
strument rated pilot and his passenger suffered fatal
injuries after departing into an indefinite ceiling with one
quarter mile visibility restricted by heavy fog. The policy
language at issue, identical to the language used by the
same insurer in the King Craft and Glover decisions, re-
quired the pilots to be "properly rated for the flight and
aircraft."10 6 Unlike the court in King Craft and Glover, how-
ever, the Mark court held that the clear, plain, and unam-
biguous policy language did not provide coverage for VFR
pilots in IFR conditions. 10 7
V. ANALYSIS OF THE INCEPTION RULE
An analysis of the above cases demonstrates that the in-
ception rule is suspect because its rationale is flawed, the
rule leads to arbitrary results, and the rule has been neither
uniformly applied nor universally accepted.
A. THE INCEPTION RULE'S RATIONALE
The cases discussed in Part IV above indicate that the
courts adopting the "inception rule" have ruled that the
-05 Id. at 1250.
104 See infra Part V(C) (2) for discussion of the concurring opinion.
105 704 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Colo. 1989).
-0 Id at 1034.
107 Id,
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phrase "the flight" requires the flight at issue to be consid-
ered as a whole. Using that ruling as a basis, the courts
have justified the inception rule for several reasons: 1) The
rule is easy to use because it allows a court to make a deci-
sion without resort to speculation or conjecture of what
kind of weather conditions the pilot may have encountered
en route;108 2) The rule provides some security for pilots
whose coverage might flicker on and off as they pass in and
out of IFR conditions;" 9 3) The insurer has the ability to
draft unambiguous language in the policy.110
Proper analysis of the inception rule requires a review of
this supporting rationale. The following discussion demon-
strates that aviation realities and the arbitrariness of results
under the inception rule undermine the first two reasons.
The third reason should not prevent the adoption of an in-
terpretation compelled by universally understood aviation
practice.
B. AvIATION REALITIES COUNSELLING AGAINST THE
RATIONALE
1. The Difficulty of Establishing Inception Weather
At least one case has stated that the inception rule allows
the court to determine the character of a flight without re-
sort to the speculation or conjecture associated with deter-
mining whether the pilot actually encountered IFR
conditions in flight. 1  Citing Transport Indemnity, the Zuver
court noted:
The analysis in King Craft and Glover provides the court with
a means to determine the character of a flight without re-
sort to speculation or conjecture .... Generally, in aviation
accidents there is very little, if any, physical evidence or eye-
witnesses to assist the court in making a segmented analysis.
'o Zuver, 750 P.2d at 1250; Transport Indemnity, 740 P.2d at 324.
King Craft, 368 F. Supp. at 479.
1o See, e.g., King Craft, 368 F. Supp. at 478; Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761; Transport
Indemnity, 740 P.2d at 323-24.
i Transport Indemnity, 740 P.2d at 324.
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Thus, a court would be forced into a process of formulating
conclusions founded upon mere probabilities. 12
The flaw with this rationale is that it assumes the weather
at the time and place of departure can be determined with-
out speculation, conjecture, or mere probabilities. The
practical reality, however, is that determining the actual
weather conditions existing at the time and place of depar-
ture, as required by the rule, is often difficult, if not impos-
sible. While such difficulty should not, by itself, call for the
abolition of the rule, it compromises the rule's stated pur-
pose of predictability.
Although many of the larger airports in the United States
have weather observation facilities on site, there is virtually
no way for the trier of fact to determine the precise weather
conditions at the majority of general aviation airports in the
United States. There are over 12,904 airports for general
aviation aircraft in the United States," 3 yet surface weather
observations are taken only at approximately 690 locations,
and an even smaller number of airports have weather fore-
casts prepared for them.'" 4 Though weather reports and
forecasts for a "nearby" airport may be available, such infor-
112 Zuver, 750 P.2d at 1250 (quoting Transport Indemnity, 740 P.2d at 324).
113 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 1993 Aviation Fact Card [hereinafter AOPA
Fact Card]. The fact card consists of 1991 data from the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the General Aviation Manufac-
turers Association. Actually, in 1991 there were 17,581 aircraft landing facilities in
the United States: 12,904 airports, 4199 heliports, 70 short takeoff and landing
ports, and 408 seaplane bases. Id. Approximately 5090 were publicly owned while
the remaining 12,491 were privately owned. Air carriers served 666 of the airports.
Id.
114 But see infra note 118. The 690 locations referenced in the text are composed
of the approximately 600 locations at which NWS or FAA personnel actually take a
manual observation of the weather (AIM at 7-10(a)), and the approximately 90
locations at which Automated Meteorological Observing Stations (AMOS) exist.
AIM, supra note 1, 1 7-10(b) (1). The National Weather Service (NWS) has one state
forecasting office in each of the 50 states. Generally, that office prepares the fore-
casts for airports which have commercial or scheduled IFR operations. In Illinois,
for example, there are approximately 1091 aircraft landing facilities. The NWS state
forecasting office based at the Lewis University near Lockport, Illinois, prepares
forecasts for only 10 airports in Illinois although approximately 21 airports in Illinois
have weather observation reporting capability. NWS, Rosemont, Illinois office,
(708) 298-1413. See also supra note 33. Many airports which have an air traffic con-
trol-tower generate weather observation reports, but not all tower controlled air-
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mation may not be dispositive of the weather conditions at
the precise time and place of departure.
Accordingly, in virtually every case in which a flight be-
gins in a locale without its own weather observation facility,
the determination of the weather conditions at the time
and place of departure will almost always present a question
of fact that will typically require eyewitness or expert mete-
orological testimony. Such testimony inevitably injects the
very speculation or conjecture that the inception rule was
designed to avoid. Where no eyewitnesses exist and the oc-
cupants of the aircraft have perished, the weather condi-
tions at the time and place of departure will be difficult, if
not impossible, to determine with any real certainty.
The Ideal Mutual and Transport Indemnity decisions are
classic examples of the inception rule's failure to eliminate
speculation or conjecture. In each case, the court had to
remand the case on the issue of weather conditions existing
at the time and place of departure." 5 The reason necessi-
tating the remands in those cases belies the evidential se-
curity courts have found in the inception rule. Neither the
Pearson Airpark nor the Rockwall Texas Airport, the air-
ports of departure in Transport Indemnity and Ideal Mutual,
respectively, had any weather reporting facilities located at
the airport." 6 Consequently, the courts had virtually no
means of determining the precise weather conditions at the
airport of departure. The transparent simplicity of the in-
ception rule did not support its application in either case.
Herein lies a major problem with the inception rule.
Even where weather observation facilities do exist at the
airport of departure, the weather at the time of departure
may be different from the weather at the time the observa-
tion was made. The National Weather Service usually
records surface weather observations at an airport approxi-
ports have forecasts prepared for them. In 1991, there were only 691 air traffic
control towers in the United States. See AOPA Fact Card, supra note 113.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 85-97.
116 This fact was confirmed by conversations with "JP" at the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration Flight Service Station in Kankakee, Illinois, on November 9, 1993, at
3:35 p.m.
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mately ten minutes before every hour.1 7 The pilot who de-
parts thirty minutes past the hour may face weather
conditions that have improved or deteriorated dramatically
during that forty-minute period. As a result, unless the pi-
lot departs at the very moment the weather observation is
taken, a question of fact will almost always exist as to the
weather conditions at the precise time and place of
departure.118
Thus, the difficulty of establishing the weather at the
time and place of departure counsels against the lack of
"speculation or conjecture" rationale upon which the in-
ception rule relies.
117 AIM, supra note 1, 7-11 (b). The hourly surface weather observation typically
includes the time of the report, the sky and ceiling conditions, the visibility and any
obstruction to vision such as rain, fog, or haze; the sea level pressure (barometer
reading) temperature and dew point, wind conditions, and any noteworthy remarks.
A "special" or "record special" weather observation may be made when significant
meteorological changes occur between hourly reports. AIM, supra note 1, 7-27.
11 The FAA has recently installed Automated Weather Observation Systems
(AWOS) at various airports in the United States. These systems consist of various
sensors, a processor, a computer-generated voice subsystem, and a transmitter to
broadcast local, minute-by-minute, real-time weather data directly to the pilot over a
discrete radio frequency. AIM, supra note 1, 7-10(d) (1). The message is typically
accessible within 25 nautical miles of the AWOS site. AIM, supra note 1, 7-
10(d) (4). The AWOS are classified in four basic levels. The AWOS-A only reports
the current altimeter setting. The AWOS-1 reports the altimeter setting, wind data,
temperature, dewpoint, and density altitude. The AWOS-2 provides the same infor-
mation as the AWOS-1 plus visibility, and the AWOS-3 reports the same information
as the AWOS-2 plus cloud and ceiling data. AIM, supra note 1, 7-10(d) (3). The
problem from an evidentiary standpoint is that, presently, most of the transmitted
data is neither recorded nor stored by the FAA. The primary surface weather ob-
serving system will ultimately be the .Automated Surface Observation System
(ASOS). The ASOS program is a joint effort of the National Weather Service, the
Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Defense to install and oper-
ate up to 1700 systems throughout the United States. AIM, supra note 1, 7-10(0.
The ASOS information relayed to the pilot is similar to, but may be more compre-
hensive than, that of the AWOS-3, especially if the ASOS report is augmented by a
personal weather observer. (Such an observation is identified as "AO2A," whereas
the unaugmented observation is identified as "A02." AIM, supra note 1, 7-
10(f)(4)(b)(4)). ASOS reports also have data collection packages that allow the
preparation of hourly surface weather observations that are transmitted and col-
lected by the NWS for dissemination to pilots. Id.
INCEPTION RULE
2. The Fortuity of the Airport's Location and Time of Day
Another drawback associated with the inception rule is
that, in cases where the accident is remote in time and loca-
tion from the place of departure, the question of whether
the flight was IFR or VFR may depend on the fortuitous
location of the airport from which the flight departed.
For purposes of this hypothetical, refer to the aeronauti-
cal chart for the Chicago area attached as Appendix B to
this article.119 Pilots who fly VFR typically refer to such a
chart for navigation. Assume there are two identically qual-
ified, non-instrument rated private pilots who intend to de-
part at the same time in identical airplanes to the same
destination. Assume further that we are able to determine,
without speculation or conjecture, that the weather at the
time and place of departure is an 800-foot ceiling with two
miles visibility. The only difference in our two flights is that
one pilot will depart from the DuPage airport and one will
depart from Olson airport approximately ten miles to the
northwest of DuPage. Both pilots unfortunately crash three
hours later after penetrating the same area of thunder-
storms, and both pilots have identical insurance policies
which require the pilot to be properly rated for the flight.
The insurer then files a complaint for declaratory judgment
claiming neither pilot was properly rated for the flight, and
the case is heard by the same judge who applies the same
law to both cases.
Given the above scenario, one would assume the cover-
age result would be the same for both pilots. But if the
court applies the inception rule, the pilot who departed the
Olson airport will be covered; the pilot who departed
Dupage will not.
According to the chart in Appendix B, the Dupage air-
port lies in "Class D" (controlled) airspace.12 0 Federal Avia-
tion Regulations provide that no person may take off under
19 These charts are known as Sectional Charts and are published by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
1- 14 C.F.R. § 71.61 (1993).
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VFR in Class D airspace unless the ground visibility is three
statute miles121 and the ceiling is at least 1000 feet.' 22 Since
the weather in our example was an 800-foot ceiling and two
miles visibility, less than the minimum required for VFR
flight in controlled airspace, IFR conditions existed, and
the pilot needed an instrument rating to be rated properly
for the flight, assuming the pilot did not obtain a special
VFR clearance to depart from the airport. 123
Despite being only ten miles from the Dupage Airport,
the Olson Airport lies in "Class G" (uncontrolled) airspace.
The basic weather minimums for VFR flight in Class G air-
space are one mile visibility and the pilot must remain clear
of the clouds. 124 Thus, the weather conditions at Olson,
though identical to those at Dupage, were above the mini-
mum weather conditions for VFR flight from that airport,
and the VFR pilot was perfectly legal in making the flight
without an instrument rating.
Change the facts of the above scenario and assume that
(1) both pilots were taking off from the Olson airport, and
(2) night officially begins at 5:00 p.m. 25 One pilot takes off
at 4:55 p.m. and the other departs ten minutes later. In this
example, the pilot who departs later is not covered under
the inception rule because flight from an airport in Class G
airspace at night requires three statute miles visibility in-
stead of the one mile required for day operations. 26
21 14 C.F.R. § 91.155(a),(d)(1) (1993).
M2' 14 C.F.R. § 91.155(c).
123 See supra note 17 (discussing Special VFR clearance).
124 See supra note 12.
125 Night is defined as the hours between the end of evening civil twilight and the
beginning of morning civil twilight, as published in the American Air Almanac.
AIM, supra note 1, at N-i. Civil twilight ends in the evening when the center of the
sun's disk is six degrees below the horizon and begins in the morning when the
sun's disk is six degrees below the horizon. Id.
126 14 C.F.R. § 91.155(a). Note that if both pilots make a nighttime departure
from the Olson airport at the same time in the same weather conditions described
in the hypothetical, but one pilot wants to fly to a different airport and the other
intends to stay in the airport traffic pattern to practice his night landings, and both
pilots have an accident during their respective flights, the pilot who stayed in the
airport traffic pattern would be covered under the inception rule while the other
pilot would not. The reason is that the Federal Aviation Regulations allow a pilot to
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These examples are just two of many showing that when
the inception rule is applied, the determination of whether
the flight was VFR or IFR can depend solely on the fortuity
of the airport's location or the time of day. There is no
logical reason to justify differing coverage results where the
occurrence is remote in time and location from the time
and place of departure.
3. The Fallacy that the "Ambiguity" of "the Flight" Limits
Inquiry to the Right's Inception
Because of the policy definition of the phrase, it may be
difficult to quarrel with the courts' literal reading of "the
flight" to require a single characterization. The rub comes
with the characterization the "inception rule" courts
choose. Accepting the necessity of considering the flight as
a whole, the question becomes: What is the most reasonable
way to do so? This question takes us directly to the "incep-
tion rule" courts' reliance on the existence of ambiguity
and the approaches to a better solution.
At the outset, it should be noted that courts have not
been unanimous in deciding whether the policy language
referred to in Part III is ambiguous. As noted above, at least
one court has indicated that the phrase "with ratings and
certificates appropriate for the flight" is plain and therefore
not ambiguous,127 and at least one court has found the
phrase "properly rated for the flight" to be clear, plain, and
unambiguous. 28
Other courts, however, have held that the phrase "the
flight" is ambiguous.129 Courts which have found the
phrase "the flight" to be ambiguous have suggested that an
exclusion prohibiting flight in IFR conditions unless the pi-
lot holds a valid instrument rating may cure the ambiguity
fly at night in an airport traffic pattern within one-half mile of the runway in Class G
airspace so long as he has one statute mile visibility. 14 C.F.R. § 91.155(b) (2).
27 Jim Hawk, 270 N.W.2d at 468.
121 Mark, 704 F. Supp. at 1034.
- Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761-62.
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problem. 130 Yet another court has held that an exclusion
for losses occurring as a result of operation "in violation of
any governmental regulations for civil aviation applying...
to instrument flying" was unambiguous.1 3 1 This resulted in
no coverage for a pilot who crashed just one-half mile after
departing into fog that limited the ceiling and visibility to
50 and 150 feet, respectively.13 2 Another court allowed the
insurer to deny coverage to a non-instrument rated pilot
who crashed in IFR conditions where the policy required
the pilot to be properly rated for "all segments of the flight
involved."'1 3  But it does not follow that the existence of
more authoritive policy language necessarily means the
present language is ambiguous.
The mandates imposed upon VFR pilots provide two ap-
proaches to challenging the findings upon which the courts
premise their "inception of flight" rulings. First, it seems
clear that Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) referred to
in Part II above, along with well-defined aviation customs,
provide standards which leave little doubt among pilots
about the meaning of the rated-for-flight provision. This
approach challenges the very assumption of ambiguity
which is the foundation of the "inception rule" solution.
Second, given the expectations concerning pilots, includ-
ing standards imposed by the FARs, a persuasive argument
can be made that the inception of flight does not constitute
a reasonable interpretation of the policy language under
discussion. This approach is less difficult than the first be-
cause it accepts that there may be some theoretical ambigu-
ity, but it proceeds to demonstrate that the interpretation
favoring the insured is, in the words of the Glover court, in-
- See King Craft, 368 F. Supp. at 479. See also N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 412:21
(1993) (allowing specific policy exclusions relating to certification of pilot).
1-1 Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1969).
132 Id.; see Tison v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York, 181 So. 2d 835 (La. App.
1966) (policy language similar to Arnold but holding that insurer failed to meet bur-
den of proving flight in IFR conditions). Because the policy language in Arnold and
Tison differs from the language found in the cases cited in Part IV of the text, the
cases were not considered in the inception rule analysis. See also Northwestern Flyers
v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1982).
133 Floyd v. Ohio Gen. Ins. Co., 701 F. Supp. 1177 (D.S.C. 1988).
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deed "unreasonable."1 1 4 Following is a brief review of the
elements supporting these challenges.
Insurance companies do not generally insure risks which,
for fundamental safety reasons, the insureds are forbidden
to undertake. Specifically, the policies' focus on the pilot's
ratings and qualifications leaves no doubt of the insurer's
intent to protect itself from liability for accidents occurring
when the VFR pilot risks conditions in which he is forbid-
den to fly. As Jim Hawk observed, the plain language of the
policy provision at issue "pertains to increasing the hazard
by flying beyond ratings."135 At least one other court has
held "[i]nsurance coverage must not be afforded aircraft
owners who ignore or refuse to comply with established cer-
tification requirements commonly part of policy exclu-
sions." 36 Indeed, the fact that courts have created the
inception rule acknowledges the significant difference in
risk between flight in IFR and VFR conditions.
This mandate that the pilot avoid weather for which he is
not qualified applies just as categorically to conditions en-
countered during flight as to those existing at the time of
take-off.1 3 7 It is inconsistent to hold that coverage exists for
the non-instrument rated pilot who crashes in IFR condi-
tions at his destination, a result compelled by the inception
rule where VFR conditions existed at takeoff, when, even
under the inception rule, no coverage exists for the non-
instrument rated pilot who crashes in IFR conditions at take-
off, as in Jim Hawk. The "inception rule" standard violates
basic common sense because it implicitly assumes it is rea-
sonable for a VFR insured to conclude, as he takes off in
VFR conditions, that he may later fly into IFR conditions
without losing coverage. Indeed, the "flickering on and
off" concern demonstrates the courts' assumption that a
VFR pilot's flight might casually pass in and out of IFR con-
ditions for which the pilot is unqualified.
- Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761.
135 Jim Hawk, 270 N.W.2d at 468.
- Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639, 641 (1983).
117 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.03(e) (1993).
1994] 213
214 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
These assumptions are unfounded. As the Glover court
acknowledged, pilots are forbidden to fly in IFR conditions
unless they hold an instrument rating.1 3 8 Accordingly, the
FARs make it plain that VFR pilots are expected to avoid
IFR conditions.1 3 9 In the vast majority of instances, this ex-
pectation can be fulfilled as pilots are trained to obtain and
interpret weather data from the ground and in the air. 140
Pilots can update weather information in flight by commu-
nicating with Air Traffic Control or Flight Service Stations
on the various frequencies referenced on the navigational
charts used by VFR pilots.'41
These realities demonstrate that, contrary to the assump-
tion of the "inception rule" courts, it is not reasonable to
characterize a flight by reference to a segment in which the
pilot did no more than adhere to his basic qualifications
when, in a later segment, he invited the very sort of acci-
dent against which his VFR-only limitation was designed to
protect.
Insurance policies should not be interpreted in a vac-
uum; they should be construed in the context of the partic-
ular subject of insurance. 142  The application of this
principle would not conflict with the rule properly favoring
the insured in cases of ambiguity created by the insurer.
Rather, it would merely aid the court in determining
whether ambiguity in fact exists. In the King Craft and
Glover circumstances, in which the pilots chose not to obey
the mandate to avoid the weather that brought them ruin,
there can be no legitimate doubt that the ambiguity princi-
138 Id
Ms9 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(e), 91.155 (1993).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
141 See supra notes 30, 36-38 and accompanying text.
142 Although courts are reluctant to rely on custom and usage, they may, in lim-
ited circumstances, resort to it to explain insurance provisions which are ambiguous.
See 13 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 7388
(1992). It would appear the mandate that a VFR pilot avoid IMC is perhaps one of
those customs which is "so well settled and generally known that all persons engaged
in such trade may be considered as contracting with reference to it that it [may be]
regarded as forming a part of a contract of insurance entered into to protect risks in
such trade." Id. at 189.
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pie does not properly apply. Since the aviation precepts re-
viewed above establish that the pilot who is rated only for
VFR must avoid IFR conditions, a mandate which can be
obeyed in most instances, it seems only sensible and fair to
interpret the exclusion at issue in a way which does not
stand these principles on their heads. Indeed, the very dis-
tinction between VFR and IFR ratings would be meaning-
less if VFR pilots were permitted to lapse into IFR flight.
Since the "inception of flight" interpretation under the cir-
cumstances of King Craft and Glover is in complete conflict
with the VFR pilot's training and responsibility to avoid IFR
conditions and with the policy's obvious intent to limit the
pilot's coverage to risks he is qualified to undertake, it
should be discarded.
The above rationale is consistent with the general law of
contracts. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides
that "a condition is an event, not certain to occur, which
must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before
performance under the contract becomes due.1143
Since the typical policy language states that coverage
does not apply "while" the aircraft is flown by pilots other
than those who are properly rated for the flight, and be-
cause such language usually is not a specific exclusion to
the policy, one could argue that flight by non-instrument
rated pilots in VFR conditions is a condition of the insurer's
duty to pay under the policy. To resolve doubts as to
whether flight in VFR conditions is made a condition of the
insurer's duty to pay, an interpretation is preferred which
will reduce the insured's risk of forfeiture. 144 The Restate-
ment provides, however, that if a condition is within a
party's control, that party assumes the risk that its non-oc-
currence will discharge the insurer's duty to pay under the
contract. 145 Because pilots are trained to obtain and inter-
pret weather data, and because they may choose not to
make the flight or to avoid adverse weather conditions, it is
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981).
1- Id, § 227(1).
145 Id § 227(1), (2).
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difficult to argue that the condition of flight in VFR condi-
tions is not within the non-instrument rated pilot's control.
Thus, it does not seem unfair to say that a pilot under those
circumstances assumes the risk that flight in IFR conditions
will cause forfeiture of his coverage.
Insureds might argue that a disproportionate forfei-
ture 4 6 occurs where the insurer's obligation to pay is dis-
charged on the basis of the non-occurrence of a condition
of VFR flight. The non-occurrence of the condition can be
excused, however, "unless its occurrence was a material part
of the agreed exchange." 147 A comment to the Restatement
provides "if the term that requires the occurrence of the
event as a condition is expressed in unmistakable language,
the possibility of forfeiture will not affect the interpretation
of that language." '148
Most aviation insurers ask in the insurance application
for the pilot's hours, ratings, and experience and, given
that information, compute the premium applicable for the
risk. The insurer then issues an endorsement or declara-
tion page which sets forth the persons who are allowed to
fly the airplane. The fact that insurers ask for and rely
upon this information, coupled with general aviation
knowledge that flight by non-instrument rated pilots in IFR
conditions increases the insurers' risk, demonstrates that
the condition of VFR flight by VFR pilots is not only ex-
pressed in unmistakable language, but is also a material
part of the agreed exchange. Consequently, there appears
to be little justification for a court to use forfeiture as a rea-
146 "In determining whether the forfeiture is 'disproportionate,' a court must
weigh the extent of the forfeiture by the obligee against the importance to the obli-
gor of the risk from which he sought to be protected and the degree to which that
protection will be lost if the non-occurrence of the condition is excused to the ex-
tent required to prevent forfeiture. The character of the agreement may, as in the
case of insurance agreements, affect the rigor with which the requirement is ap-
plied." Id. § 229 cmt. b.
W, Id, § 229.
141 Id. § 229 cmt. a.
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son to create an ambiguity or to excuse the condition of
VFR flight. 149
C. INCONSISTENCY OF RESULTS CAUSED BY THE NON-
UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE PILOT KNOWLEDGE
FACTOR
Another problem with the "inception rule" is that it has
not been uniformly applied. Essentially, only four state ju-
risdictions have considered the IFR/VFR issue. Although
three of the four states have adopted the inception rule,
each of those states applies it differently. Washington, in
Zuver and Transport Indemnity, did not consider a pilot's
knowledge of the weather conditions in applying the incep-
tion rule.' 50 Texas, however, in Marr's Short Stop, held that a
pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions at takeoff (pre-
sumably as opposed to knowledge gained in flight) is a fac-
tor to consider in applying the inception rule. 5
Notwithstanding Marr's Short Stop, at least one Texas case
has ignored strong evidence that the pilot knew before
takeoff that he would encounter IFR conditions enroute.152
119 The court in Andersen noted "because Federal law requires pilots to hold valid,
current medical certificates to fly their planes legally, [the insurer] could justifiably
have taken it as a given that [the pilot] would have such a [medical] certificate before
operating the insured aircraft." 763 P.2d at 258. Similarly, because federal regula-
tions require pilots to hold instrument ratings to fly in IFR conditions legally, insur-
ers should be justified in assuming that pilots will have such a rating before flying
into such conditions. Thus, forfeiting insurance coverage does not necessarily de-
feat the parties' reasonable expectations.
-5o See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
112 In Ranger Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 707 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), the policy required the pilot to hold licenses and ratings as required by
the FAA for the flight involved. The non-instrument rated pilot's plane crashed in
weather conditions of an indefinite sky obscuring cloud ceiling of 200 feet with visi-
bility of a half mile in rain, fog and haze. The trial court noted that VFR conditions
prevailed at the time and place of takeoff and held that the pilot did not know at the
time of departure that he would encounter IFR conditions. Id. at 139. The court of
appeals noted that: (1) the area forecast warned the pilot of possible IFR conditions
along the route; (2) the FSS briefer advised the pilot that VFR flight was not recom-
mended; and (3) the NTSB investigator and two pilot experts testified that the
weather briefings given to the pilot advised him of the potential for IFR conditions
en route. Id. at 140-41. Based on that record, the court would have found the pilot
not appropriately rated for the flight. Id. at 142. But because the court would not
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Assuming that the Andersen court of appeals' decision is
still good law, Arizona has modified the inception rule by
allowing courts to consider weather forecasts (as opposed
to weather reports of existing conditions) available to the
pilot at the time and place of departure."' 3 The fourth
state, Iowa, presumably would not adopt the inception rule
because the Jim Hawk court found no ambiguity in the pol-
icy language which required the pilot to be appropriately
rated for the flight.154
The federal decisions reflect a similar split of authority.
In King Craft, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to consider a pilot's knowledge of the weather con-
ditions,155 while in Ideal Mutual the same court held that a
pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions at takeoff must
be considered by the court in applying the inception
rule. 156 The Eighth Circuit would probably reject the pi-
lot's knowledge of the weather conditions because the
court paid little attention to the insurer's argument in
Northwestern Flyers that the pilot voluntarily chose to fly
above 18,000 feet. If the court in Ideal Mutual had ignored
pilot knowledge as King Craft suggests, or in hindsight as
Zuver suggests, then there would have been no reason to
place any weight on the statement during the pilot's pref-
light briefing that VFR conditions were expected for the
flight. Even if pilot knowledge were a relevant inquiry, the
inception rule required the court in Ideal Mutual to ignore
that statement because it was over one and a half hours old
and therefore did not contain evidence indicative of the
weather at the time and place of departure.
The application of the inception rule clearly differs from
one jurisdiction to another thereby resulting in inconsistent
decisions. These differences in approach reflect varying de-
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court, the court upheld the trial
court's decision on the issue. Id.
' Andersen, 763 P.2d at 261; see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
1 im Hawk, 270 N.W.2d at 468. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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grees of understanding concerning aviation realities rather
than any basic difference in considered theory.
1. Why Courts Reject Pilot Knowledge
Having established that the rationale for the inception
rule is weak at best, perhaps it is appropriate to question
whether there is any reason to reject pilot knowledge of the
weather conditions in determining whether the pilot was
properly rated for the flight.
The case most often cited for the refusal to consider the
pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions is Glover.
Glover, however, indicated only that the pilot's knowledge of
the weather conditions was not controlling.157 The stated
reasons for rejecting evidence of the pilot's knowledge of
the weather conditions are that (1) it forces the court to
question the reasonableness of the pilot's actions when the
pilot purchased insurance to protect himself from the con-
sequences of his own negligence, 158 and (2) it forces the
court to adopt the precepts of negligence law without re-
quiring any causation between the pilot's knowledge and
the cause of the crash.1 59
In an earlier case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, al-
beit dealing with different exclusionary wording, expressed
this concern in more detail:
[The VFR pilot's] culpability lay in the fact that he crossed
over to the nonvisual world when he was certificated to fly
only in the visual world. If he transgressed any rule of the
CAA, it was in the area covering visual flying. But this cir-
cumstance does not help the [insurer's] case because viola-
tion of the rules of visual flying does not exclude liability
under the policy. It would be quite illogical if it were other-
wise. If an insurance policy would not indemnify a visual
flight pilot for losses incurred by an infraction of visual
flight rules, there would be little purpose in purchasing a
policy. Obviously the only reason why one undertakes to
151 Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 763.
'5 Id.
'59 Transport Indemnity, 740 P.2d at 326.
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pay a stated sum for protective insurance is to be saved
harmless in the event he does something wrong. If an acci-
dent occurs when he is doing what is right, he would not be
liable in any event.'60
This statement may illuminate the essential problem
raised by the policy language under discussion: finding the
proper balance between the insured pilot's desire to
purchase insurance against her own negligence and the
common-sense conclusion that neither the insurer nor the
VFR pilot should expect coverage to apply where the avia-
tion mandates are disobeyed by acts known by all VFR pilots
and aviation insurers to increase the risk of loss.
2. Why Pilot Knowledge Should Be Considered
At the outset, it should be noted that courts' unwilling-
ness to consider the pilot's knowledge or state of mind is
not compelled by insurance law in general. In other types
of insurance coverage disputes, evidence of the insured's
knowledge or state of mind is relevant and essential. For
example, courts may consider the insured's knowledge
where the insured allegedly commits misrepresentation or
fraud, 161 knowingly misrepresents his prior medical his-
tory16 2 or contests the applicability of the "intentional act"
exclusion in a policy.163 Thus, the blanket statement that
an insured's knowledge is not relevant to actions sounding
in contract has no basis in the law.
The concurring opinion by justice Goodloe in Zuver sum-
marizes the problems associated with blind application of
160 Weissman v. Prashker, 175 A.2d 63, 68 (Pa. 1961). Though its ultimate deci-
sion is suspect, Weissman is required reading for anyone remotely interested in avia-
tion-related literary entertainment. Contained among numerous pearls of wisdom is
the court's observation that the non-instrument rated pilot in IFR conditions "could
only grope and hope." Id. at 66.
161 See, e.g., 1AJOHN A. APPLEMAN &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE
§§ 274, 276 (1992); American Continental Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gerkens, 591 N.E.2d
774, 777-78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
162 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 161, § 277.
163 See Western States Ins. Co. v. Kelley-Williamson Co., 569 N.E.2d 1289, 1292-93
(111. App. Ct. 1991) (considering insured's mental capacity in determining whether
insured intended to drive vehicle into building).
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the inception rule by observing that under the majority's
analysis:
[C] lear weather at the time and place of takeoff guarantees
insurance coverage for a VFR pilot for the entire flight, even
if the pilot deliberately chooses to violate the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations (FARs) requiring VFR pilots to fly only
under weather conditions allowing specified ranges of visi-
bility. Therefore . . . a VFR pilot could take off from an
airport in Yakima or Spokane under clear skies, knowing that
poor weather conditions exist over the mountains; that pilot
could continue west and, upon encountering conditions
under which he is not qualified to fly, continue onward, de-
liberately entering cloud banks which obscure his view, all
without disrupting his insurance coverage."'
As the above excerpt suggests, the decision to penetrate
IFR conditions, or to continue flight therein, usually will be
a knowledgeable one. It is perhaps this quasi-intentional
policy violation which results in the same unfairness to the
insurer as that caused by misrepresentation.
As stated above, some courts have expressed concern that
consideration of the pilot's knowledge of the weather con-
ditions forces a court to adopt the precepts of negligence
law without considering whether the pilot's knowledge was
causally related to the loss. However, especially in states
which do not impose the causal connection requirement,'65
1 Zuver, 750 P.2d at 1251 (emphasis added).
6 The majority view does not require a causal connection between the breach of
a policy term or condition and the loss. See, e.g., ALASKA: Bequette v. National Ins.
Underwriters, Inc., 429 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying Alaska law; failure to
meet pilot requirements set forth in policy); ARIZONA: Security Ins. Co. v. Andersen,
763 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1988); CALIFORNIA: National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 237
Cal. Rptr. 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (failure to possess current medical certificate);
FLORIDA: Hollywood Flying Serv., Inc. v. Compass Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1979) (applying Florida law; breach of pilot warranty clause); Florida Power & Light
Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); GEORGIA: Grisby
v. Houston Fire & Casualty Co., 148 S.E.2d 925 (1966) (violation of regulations per-
taining to airman's certificate); IDAHO: Roberts v. Underwriters at Lloyds London,
195 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Idaho 1961) (pilot not named on policy limiting coverage to
named pilots); ILLINOIS: Johnson v. Security Ins. Co., 481 N.E.2d 1263, (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (no coverage for flight in violation of student pilot endorsement pertaining to
flight instructor approval); but see American States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc.,
456 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (pilot not specifically named on policy limiting
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one should remember that the reason for inquiring into
the pilot's knowledge is not to determine whether he was at
fault for the occurrence. Rather, the inquiry is conducted
solely to search for available evidence of the weather condi-
tions that the pilot encountered. The answer to the ques-
tion will determine whether a breach of the contract or the
failure to comply with a condition has occurred. If the
court determines that a breach has occurred by flying into
IFR conditions, then no coverage should be afforded under
the policy. Such a result would be perfectly consistent with
cases denying coverage without requiring a causal connec-
tion between the accident and the pilot's failure to have a
coverage to named pilots); KANSAS: Western Food Prods. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co., 699 P.2d 579 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (failure to possess current medical certifi-
cate); KrrNTucv. Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1969) (appar-
ently applying Kentucky law; non-instrument rated pilot in IMC, in violation of
insurance policy and governmental regulations); MARYLAND: Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Urner, 287 A.2d 764 (Md. 1972) (failure to hold private pilot certificate as
required in declarations); MASSACHUSETrs: Edmonds v. United States, 642 F.2d 877
(1st Cir. 1981) (applying Massachusetts law; failure to have received current biennial
flight review); MICHIGAN: Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 40 N.W.2d 90
(Mich. 1949) (student pilot carrying passenger in violation of federal regulations
and insurance policy); NEBRASKA: Omaha Skydivers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger
Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973) (failure to possess current medical certificate); NEw
YoRmc Hedges Enter., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 225 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1962) (failure to possess aircraft registration in violation of federal regulations
and insurance policy); NEw MEXICO: Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d
639 (N.M. 1983) (failure to possess valid airworthiness certificate); NORTH CARO-
UNA: Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Alfa Aviation, Inc., 300 S.E.2d 877 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983), affd, 312 S.E.2d 426 (N.C. 1984) (failure to possess current medical
certificate); OHIO: American Continental Ins. Co. v. Gerkens, 591 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990) (unlicensed pilot unqualified under pilot requirements endorse-
ment); OKLAHoMA: Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588 (Okla. 1992) (failure to
possess standard airworthiness certificate); OREGON: Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 636
P.2d 421 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), petition for review denied, 644 P.2d 1128 (Or. 1982)
(failure to possess valid airworthiness certificate); PENNSYLVANIA: DiSanto v. Enstrom
Helicopter Corp., 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (failure to satisfy several re-
quirements under open pilot warranty); PUERTO Rico: United States Fire Ins. Co. v.
Producciones Padosa, Inc., 835 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying Puerto Rico law;
failure to satisfy minimum turbine engine experience requirements under policy);
TENNESSEE: Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Lynpal, Inc., [1977] 14 Av. Cas. 18,067 (fail-
ure to possess valid medical certificate); VIRGINIA: Powell Valley Elec. Coop. v.
United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Va. 1959) (sug-
gesting that no causal connection exists).
INCEPTION RULE
valid medical certificate, 6 6 a biennial flight review, 167 an
aircraft type rating, 68 or a valid aircraft airworthiness cer-
tificate. 169 In states which require the breach of the policy
term or condition to be causally related to the loss in order
for the insurer to avoid coverage,' 7 ° a court should not be
reluctant to apply the "precepts of negligence" law because
it will apply those precepts when determining whether the
policy breach contributed to the cause of the loss.
The second fault with the "precepts of negligence" argu-
ment is that it assumes that the insured is the only party
who benefits from the rejection of the pilot's knowledge of
the weather conditions. Though one might argue that the
inception rule is designed to protect the insured to the det-
riment of the insurer, the following example, similar to the
facts in Ideal Mutual, demonstrates that ignoring evidence
of the pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions can be
unfair to the insured as well as the insurer.
Suppose, for example, Pilot A is intending to depart from
an airport which requires the minimum weather conditions
for VFR flight to be one mile visibility and requires the pilot
to remain clear of the clouds. The pilot telephones the FSS
from the airport of intended departure and the following
conversation takes place:
FSS: We don't have any weather information for your air-
port, but Smith Field five miles north is reporting visibility
I" See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Meyer, 237 Cal. Rptr. 632
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
167 See, e.g., Edmonds v. United States, 642 F.2d 877, 883 (lst Cir. 1981).
68 See, e.g., Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. C.D.I. Constr. Inc., 640 F.2d 654, 661 (5th Cir.
1981).
-6 See, e.g., Avemco Ins. Co. v. White, 841 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1992).
170 A minority of jurisdictions have upheld a causal connection requirement. See,
e.g., O'Connor v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985) (failure to perform
proper annual aircraft inspection); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142
(D. Haw. 1975) (failure to possess current medical certificate); Bayers v. Omni Avia-
tion Mgrs., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mont. 1981) (failure to possess valid medical
certificate); Gardner Trucking Co. v. South Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 376 S.E.2d
260 (S.C. 1989) (failure to satisfy multiple flight experience requirements under
policy, and failure to possess valid airworthiness certificate); Puckett v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984) (invalid airworthiness certificate).
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of 4 miles, and Jones Field five miles south is reporting one-
half mile visibility with light rain and fog.
Pilot: Well it looks to me here at the airport that the visibil-
ity is about two miles because I can see the trees at the end
of the farm next to the airport.
The pilot then departs and later has an accident. Sup-
pose that a witness later testifies that he was in the airport
lobby at the same time that the pilot departed the airport
and is adamant that the visibility could not have been
greater than one-half mile at takeoff.
Because the inception rule requires the court to look
only at the weather conditions existing at the time and
place of departure, the court must reject the evidence of
the weather at the Smith and Jones airports. Likewise, be-
cause the inception rule requires the court to exclude from
consideration the pilot's knowledge of the weather condi-
tions, his statement to the FSS briefer is inadmissible. Con-
sequently, the only admissible evidence is the testimony of
the ground witness who testified that IFR conditions existed
at the time and place of departure. This would likely result
in summary judgment in favor of the insurer when, if the
pilot's statement were admitted, the trier of fact could
weigh the evidence and possibly find that the pilot's percep-
tion of the weather was more accurate than that of the
ground-based witness. The inception rule prohibits such a
balancing test. The rule also prevents the court from using
the weather data at Smith and Jones Fields as circumstantial
evidence of the weather conditions at the place of depar-
ture. Another example of how the insured can suffer from
a court's failure to consider his knowledge of the weather
conditions appears in the next section.
3. How Much Knowledge Should Be Considered
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Marr's Short
Stop"'71 and the Arizona court of appeals' decision in Ander-
-71 680 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1984).
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sen 172 seek a balance between aviation realities and the in-
sured pilot's legitimate purpose in obtaining coverage. As
discussed above, Marr's held that no coverage applied be-
cause the pilot received pre-flight weather reports that sup-
ported a finding that he actually knew he would be flying
into IFR conditions. The court also ruled that the VFR pi-
lot's request for and receipt of an IFR clearance for take-off
could support a finding by the jury that the pilot actually
knew at the inception of the flight that he would be flying
into IFR conditions.173 Although the Marr's test (and the
concurring opinion's test therein) and Andersen are a step
in the right direction, neither case goes far enough. Each
has several shortcomings that flow from the inherent re-
striction to weather reports and forecasts available to the
pilot at the time and place of departure.
The problem with such a restriction is that it does allow
consideration of the recency or accuracy of a forecast and
does not acknowledge a pilot's ability to obtain updated
weather information in flight. Although area and terminal
forecasts are issued by the National Weather Service (NWS)
three times daily,'74 the NWS may amend the forecasts as
conditions change or stabilize. As previously discussed, pi-
lots have the ability to communicate in flight with various
facilities to update stale weather information, to obtain real
time weather data, and to determine whether the weather
conditions en route or at the intended destination are in
accord with the forecast.
The concurring opinion in Marr's Short Stop, later
adopted in Andersen, unfortunately would require a court to
ignore evidence a pilot obtains in flight. The failure to con-
sider such information can result in unfairness either for
the insured or for the insurer. For example, assume that a
pilot's pre-flight weather briefing indicates that VFR condi-
tions prevail at the time and place of departure, that IFR
conditions currently exist at the destination airport, and
172 763 P.2d 251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
173 Marr's Short Stop, 650 S.W.2d at 5.
174 See supra note 33.
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that IFR conditions are forecast to exist at the time of arri-
val at the destination airport. The pilot makes a legal de-
parture in VFR conditions, contacts a Flight Service Station
en route who advises him that the weather at the destina-
tion airport has dramatically improved to VFR conditions,
and later has an accident. Under the Marr's Short Stop con-
currence, the pilot would be deemed not properly rated for
the flight because the reports and forecasts at the time of
departure indicated that IFR conditions did and would pre-
vail at the destination. This result would be unfair to the
insured where there is little additional information known
about the weather conditions that the pilot encountered en
route.
If one agrees with the Marr's Short Stop court that a pilot
should not expect to be covered if she takes off knowing
that she will fly into conditions for which she is not rated,
then perhaps the scope of this assumption-of-the-risk ra-
tionale should not be limited to conditions of which the
pilot is aware at the inception of the flight. Furthermore, the
question remains as to what constitutes the kind of knowl-
edge which will suffice to prevent coverage.
In regard to both the weather conditions and the pilot's
knowledge of them, it seems illogical to choose the condi-
tions prevailing at the inception of flight on the basis of
practicalities. As demonstrated in the previous section, the
lack of specific data concerning many points of take-off may
make it no less difficult to characterize accurately the "in-
ception of flight" conditions and pilot knowledge than to
characterize conditions and knowledge arising later in the
flight.1 7 5
The court in Marr's Short Stop emphasized pointedly that
the pilot in Glover "did not know when he took off that he
was flying into IFR weather." 176 Thus, although Marr's Short
175 See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in deter-
mining weather conditions at the time and place of departure).
176 Mart's Short Stop, 680 S.W.2d at 6. The pilot in Glover did know that at the time
he took off IFR conditions existed in his projected flight path, but it was forecast
that VFR conditions would exist at the time of his arrival. Id.
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Stop looks beyond the weather conditions prevailing at the
time and place of take-off, it limits the consideration of the
pilot's knowledge to the period before and at take-off. But
if the pilot's request for an IFR clearance to depart in Marr's
Short Stop was sufficient evidence of intent, then so should
have been the King Craft pilot's request for an IFR clear-
ance to land. Furthermore, the King Craft tower controller's
statement minutes before the accident that IFR conditions
prevailed at the airport of intended destination certainly
had the same degree of trustworthiness as the pre-takeoff
statements of the Marr's Short Stop tower controller.
Accordingly, there is no persuasive practical reason why
the knowledge that the Marr's Short Stop court and Justice
Goodloe's concurrence in Zuver found so persuasive should
be limited to that which the pilot possesses at the beginning
of the flight. Rather, the fairness motivating the Marr's
Short Stop court and Justice Goodloe can be honored only
by considering knowledge later acquired during the flight
as well. It seems only reasonable to extend the Marr's Short
Stop rationale to any situation in which the VFR pilot ac-
quires knowledge of impending IFR conditions requiring
changes in altitude or course. Unfortunately, Andersen spe-
cifically refused to reach the issue of a pilot's duty once he
becomes aware of information during the flight which sug-
gests that the conditions en route have become IFR. The
question then becomes: What kind of knowledge will in-
voke this responsibility?
Presumably, in most cases the VFR pilot's entering IFR
conditions will constitute a knowledgeable undertaking.177
But it is possible that occasionally the VFR pilot may unex-
pectedly encounter IFR conditions. In such a case, it would
appear reasonable to argue that the VFR-only pilot's man-
date to obtain and interpret weather data and avoid IFR
conditions imposes upon him constructive knowledge of
weather conditions developing along the route and that
this constructive knowledge should prevent coverage under
7 For a general discussion of the VFR-into-IFR accident, see Horne, The VFR-Into-
IMC Accident, supra note 9.
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the exclusion at issue. 178  If a pilot discovers en route that
two airports within ten miles of his intended destination are
reporting IFR (VFR) conditions, the pilot arguably has con-
structive knowledge that IFR (VFR) conditions may, though
not necessarily must, exist at his destination.
The tenet of granting coverage absent clear wording to
the contrary would appear to permit, at the least, that con-
structive knowledge of such an extreme sort as to consti-
tute, in and of itself, an assumption of the risk should be
grafted onto the exclusion under discussion. Such a high
degree of constructive knowledge could be likened to the
"wilful and wanton disregard" which, like intentional acts,
supports punitive damages awards in some jurisdictions. 179
The strong mandate that the VFR-only pilot must avoid IFR
conditions suggests that constructive knowledge in the pres-
ent context must also include knowledge that the reason-
able pilot in her shoes would have had or acquired in
similar circumstances.
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Having established that (1) the inception rule's rationale
does not justify its application, (2) the rule has been ap-
plied differently by different jurisdictions, (3) at least one
jurisdiction has largely rejected the rule, (4) most IFR/VFR
issues are unlikely to be decided by summary judgment,
and (5) consideration of the pilot's knowledge of the
weather conditions both before and during the flight is
neither unfair nor contrary to any rule of law, it seems ap-
propriate to propose a different test for determining
whether a pilot was properly rated for the flight involved.
'7 Since constructive knowledge is knowledge that a reasonable person would
have or acquire in the same circumstances, a VFR-only pilot would presumably not
be held to have knowledge which those circumstances placed beyond his reach.
179 In Illinois, for example, the first prerequisite to a jury's imposition of punitive
damages is that the defendant's conduct "was wilful and wanton." "Wilful and wan-
ton" conduct is defined as "a course of action which shows actual or deliberate in-
tention to harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or
conscious disregard for a person's own safety and the safety of others." Illinois Pat-
tern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 14.01 and 35.01 (2d Ed. 1971).
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This author's suggested test for courts faced with the IFR/
VFR coverage issue discussed herein is as follows:
In determining whether a non-instrument rated pilot was
properly rated for the flight, the trier of fact should ex-
amine all evidence tending to establish the weather condi-
tions encountered by the pilot during the flight at issue.
Evidence relevant to the weather conditions encountered
should include: (1) the type of airspace through which the
pilot flew, (2) surface weather observations, (3) any weather
forecasts including area and terminal forecasts which were
available to the pilot before or during the flight, (4) pref-
light weather briefings (most of which are recorded by the
FAA), (5) any inflight weather information given to or re-
quested by the pilot, (6) satellite or radar images of the
weather, (7) statements of other pilots in the area, (8) any
statements by the pilot, (9) statements of any ground-based
occurrence witnesses, and (10) expert testimony, if neces-
sary. If, based on what is known about the routes and alti-
tudes flown by the pilot, 80 an examination of such evidence
establishes that, more likely than not, the pilot did not en-
counter weather conditions less than the minimum weather
conditions required for VFR flight, then the pilot is properly
rated for the flight.
The proposed rule is consistent with the policy language
at issue in inception rule decisions because it can be used to
look at the flight as a whole. If, given the above evidence,
the entire flight as a whole (i.e., from takeoff to landing, or
as otherwise defined in the policy), could not have been
-80 The route and altitudes are important because a pilot may have flown above
the area of adverse weather. For example, even if all of the weather reporting sta-
tions along the middle third of the route show that IFR conditions prevailed at those
locations, other weather data such as pilot reports (PIREPS) might establish that the
cloud tops along that portion of the route were 3000 feet above the ground. Addi-
tional evidence such as air traffic control radar data or transcripts may establish that
the pilot actually flew the aircraft along that route at an altitude of 4500 feet and
therefore clear of the adverse weather. So long as the pilot complies with the visibil-
ity and distance-from-cloud requirements for VFR flight as set forth in 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.155(a), see supra note 12, the private pilot is not required to maintain visual
contact with the ground during an otherwise VFR flight. Thus, it is possible for a
private pilot to fly in VFR conditions above, or "on top" of, an area of IFR condi-
tions. Student pilots, however, must maintain visual contact with the ground. See 14
C.F.R. § 61.89(a) (7) (1993).
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conducted in VFR conditions, there is no coverage for the
loss. A pilot's knowledge of what the weather is or might be
should be neither dispositive nor totally ignored in deter-
mining whether the flight was IFR or VFR. In other words,
if a pilot is told by the FSS briefer during his weather brief-
ing that IFR conditions exist along his route of flight, the
court's inquiry should not terminate.'81 By the same token,
however, such evidence should not be ignored, because it is
relevant, not to the issue of the reasonableness of the pilot's
conduct, but to the issue of the weather conditions which
may have existed during the flight. Thus, a court should
neither affirm nor deny coverage solely on the basis of the
pilot's knowledge of the weather conditions, but should
consider such evidence along with any other relevant evi-
dence presented on the issue of the weather conditions en-
countered during the subject flight.
VII. ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS WITH THE
PROPOSED TEST
As with any proposed rule for determining such an issue,
one can expect several arguments against the test.
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETING CONTRACT
PROVISIONS IN LIGHT OF ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT
In Parker v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co.,l8 2 the
Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
It is true that . . . "there is no judicial duty but to give the
language its usual and ordinary meaning." We adhere to
that view; but a corollary rule of construction is also applica-
ble, i.e., when the courts have repeatedly interpreted certain
words in legal documents as having a particular meaning
and the drafters of such legal documents continue to use
such words with knowledge of the interpretation placed
upon them by the courts it will be assumed that the drafts-
181 See supra note 178.
182 582 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. 1979).
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men in using such words did so knowingly with the inten-
tion that such judicial gloss will be placed upon them. 183
Despite the few cases implicating the kind of provision at
issue, one could argue that the "inception rule" appears to
be well entrenched. As the courts in King Craft and Glover
noted,184 insurers have the ability to write exclusions of un-
assailable clarity. Thus, courts which earlier might have
been receptive to the rule proposed above might arguably
still apply the "inception rule" at this late date, especially
since it appears that many of the policies in existence today
continue to use the same language that some courts have
construed as ambiguous. It would appear, however, that
the relatively small number of cases and jurisdictions es-
pousing the "inception rule," coupled with the inconsistent
application of the rule, do not amount to a body of prece-
dent sufficient to create an effective gloss on the policy lan-
guage under discussion.
B. THE WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE FAVORING THE
EXISTENCE OF COVERAGE
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the proposed rule - the
one that was no doubt pivotal in creating the inception rule
- is the courts' general desire to rule in favor of insurance
coverage whenever possible. There is no need to recite
here the multitude of ways the courts express this desire. 185
As fair as the proposed test may be, lawyers will continue to
argue, and courts will continue to hold, that insurers have
the means to write exclusions of absolute clarity concerning
pilots who have accidents in weather conditions for which
they are not rated. Perhaps this article and some of the
cases cited herein have established that the policy language
at issue is neither ambiguous nor in need of redrafting.
183 582 S.W.2d at 383; see also Raflero v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 85 Cal.
Rptr. 701, 706 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that it is not necessary to apply rules
of construction when policy provisions like the one at issue have been amply treated
in precedent).
I See Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 764; King Craft, 368 F. Supp. at 479.
185 For a review of approaches courts take to ensure liberality in the construction
of insurance contracts, see 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 142, §§ 7401-05.
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C. THE POSSIBILITY OF UNFAIR RESULTS
One might argue that the proposed rule would result in
unfairness to a pilot who departs in beautiful VFR condi-
tions, flies for five seconds in IFR conditions through the
only cumulus cloud in the state, flies two hours thereafter
in VFR conditions, and suffers an accident in VFR condi-
tions. In such a situation, the inception rule may yield a
more just result than the proposed rule because the pro-
posed rule would result in no coverage despite the unre-
lated and relatively minor breach. Notwithstanding the fact
that the likelihood of such an occurrence is remote, the
real argument in this situation sounds in causation. Such a
scenario should be treated in the same manner courts have
handled other policy violations, such as flight without a
valid medical certificate or aircraft airworthiness certificate,
which are unrelated to the loss. The result depends on how
the particular jurisdiction applies the causal connection re-
quirement as referred to in Part V(C) (2) of this article.
A corollary argument is that the proposed rule will give
insurers another means by which to escape coverage. This
argument is illusory because the rule does not create an ex-
ception to coverage; it is simply a tool to aid the court in
determining whether the pilot has complied with a stated
policy condition.
Another anticipated argument is that the existence of
coverage under the proposed rule may depend on the for-
tuity of the place of the accident. For example, one might
argue that if the ceiling is 800 feet and the visibility is two
miles, the pilot who crashes in controlled airspace is not
covered while the pilot who crashes in uncontrolled air-
space is covered. The answer in such a case, unlike the an-
swer to the hypothetical situation raised in part V(B) (2) of
this Article, does not depend exclusively on the type of air-
space involved. Rather, the answer depends on whether the
pilot encountered IFR conditions. One must not forget that it
is entirely possible to encounter IFR conditions even where




The above analysis has established that the inception-rule
has been neither universally accepted nor uniformly ap-
plied, has created coverage where it otherwise should not
have existed, and has the potential to destroy coverage
where it should exist. Though some courts have gone to
great lengths to find ambiguous the policy language requir-
ing the pilot to be properly rated for the flight, well-estab-
lished aviation practices counsel against such a conclusion.
Moreover, the rule's failure to account for a pilot's preflight
and inflight knowledge of the weather has no sound legal
justification, and the difficulty of establishing the inception
weather undermines the rule's dream of speculation-free
decisions. Consequently, the rule encourages arbitrary re-
sults which can be unfair to both the insured and the in-
surer. The rule, therefore, should be abolished. The test
proposed in this article, though not without faults, is
designed to avoid the inception rule's shortcomings and to
provide the courts with a more fair and just test for deter-
mining whether the pilot is properly rated for the flight.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY TABLE OF IFR/VFR CASES IN TEXT
Follows
Inception Considers Pilc
Case Court Policy Language Ambiguous Rule Knowledge
King Craft 5th Circuit while properly rated Yes Yes No
for the flight
Glover Texas while properly rated Yes Yes No
for the flight
im Hawk Iowa with ratings and cer- No No Undecided
tificates appropriate
for the flight
N'wstn Flyers 8th Circuit with ratings as Yes Yes No
required by the FAA
for the flight
involved
Mart's Short Texas with ratings as Yes Yes Yes.
Stop required by the FAA Conditions a
for the flight Takeoff Onl)
involved
Andersen* Arizona properly certificated, Undecided Yes Yes.
rated and qualified Conditions
under the current and Forecast
applicable FARs for at Takeoff
the operation Only
involved
Ideal Mutual 5th Circuit with ratings as Undecided Yes Yes.
required by the FAA Conditions at
for the flight Takeoff Only
involved
Trnspt. Wash. properly rated for Yes Yes No
Indmty. the flight involved












Mark D. Colo. while properly rated No No Undecided
for the flight
* Vacated on other grounds.
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